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On 23 April 2013, the people of Bhutan went to the polls to elect a new upper house, or 
National Council (NC), for the second time ever in their country’s history. This marked the 
beginning of the national parliamentary election process, which will conclude  before the end 
of July this year after the second round of polls for the lower house –  the National Assembly 
(NA) – is held. The NA was dissolved on 20 April and has to be reconstituted within 90 days. 
Based on a first assessment, one can state that, besides some weather-related concerns and 
hurdles, the NC elections were held relatively smoothly. Most importantly, they were not 
disturbed by any ‘politically motivated’ violent incident of significance or by undue 
interference by any state institutions or other actors. In short, the elections were free and fair.  
 
A positive development was the increase in the number of nominated candidates for the 20 
Dzongkhags, the country’s constituencies for the NC elections. This ensured that each 
constituency, unlike in the 2008 elections, had at least one candidate to vote for. Only the 
decline in the voter turnout, from 53 per cent to around 45 per cent (171,544 out of 379,819 
registered voters), clouded the enthusiasm for the latest NC elections. Nevertheless, this 
performance is still a great achievement, considering the fact that Bhutan’s democratic 
procedures are still in their infancy. There is hardly any information available on how deeply 
entrenched democratic norms and values are in the kingdom’s polity and society. Many 
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 seem to agree that the country is progressing well on the path of democracy. The 
country’s process of democratic transition is commonly praised for several important reasons. 
While the state’s shift towards democracy is indeed a unique and laudable process, the 
context within which it is taking place deserves closer evaluation. 
 
 
A ‘Royal Gift’  
 
First of all, one cannot deny that the decision of the King to deliberately give up much of his 
power to his people – as a ‘royal gift’ that transforms the country from an absolute monarchy 
into a parliamentary democracy – is a rare phenomenon in the world. The rationale behind 
such a process is usually twofold. The establishment of democracy is an elite-driven process 
in the form of a top-down model. As such, it is not an outcome of a social-political movement 
or a revolutionary act. Additionally, it should also conceal the potential notion that it was a 
move by the King to voluntarily share power before he gets forced to do so.  Since the 1950s, 
several attempts were made to set up organisational platforms to mobilise political opposition 
among ethnic groups, especially among Bhutanese of Nepalese origin. The most prominent 
examples are the Bhutan State Congress (BSC) in 1952, the People’s Forum for Human 
Rights Bhutan (PFHRB) in 1989, the Bhutan People’s Party (BPP) in 1990 and the Bhutan 
National Democratic Party (BNDP) in 1992. The BPP was the instigator of anti-government 
protests which were immediately quelled by the government. Although an outright rebellion 
was prevented, the protests did initiate a political transition in the country. As such, the 
monarch is in control of the transfer of power and is able to secure a significant role for the 
royal family in the country’s future.  
 
Second, closely related with the argument of ‘giving up power voluntarily’, there is the 
persistent view about the ‘apathy’ of the Bhutanese people towards democracy. More 
concretely, there are claims – by critics of democracy and by proponents of a slow and 
gradual democratic transition – that the Bhutanese people are not in favour of democracy 
since it is perceived to be something which does not fit into the Bhutanese culture and 
traditions.  
 
Third, as is pointed out time and again, the creation of a democratic system of governance in 
Bhutan needs time. Therefore, the Bhutanese monarchy intentionally abstained from a hasty 
development in order to avoid any undesirable side-effects of opening up the country in 
socio-economic and political terms. The reason for this is the conviction of the royal 
administrations that Bhutan is only able to achieve sustainable progress through a gradual 
approach towards tackling the issues of underdevelopment, not only economically but 
especially politically. Therefore, a highly innovative idea got conceptualised; the so-called 
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Gross National Happiness (GNH). As the overarching philosophy of economic growth and 
socio-political progress, the GNH expresses the conviction that all development strategies 
must contribute to both the material well-being as well as the spiritual, emotional and cultural 
needs of the Bhutanese people. Each modernisation strategy must maintain a balance between 
the material and non-material needs of individuals and society. The GNH is, among other 
things, calculated on the basis of economic growth; promotion of cultural heritage (i.e., that 
of the ruling elite); environmental preservation and sustainability; and good governance. 
Underlying these pillars is the belief that Gross National Happiness is more important than 
Gross National Product. 
 
 
A Democratic Buzz 
 
However, even though the country has demonstrated its ability to hold successful elections, 
one cannot help but get the impression that the overall ‘feel good approach’ is starting to lose 
some of its appeal and glamour, especially for the uneducated people who are confronted 
with fewer socio-economic opportunities in the country. Despite the fact that the government-
friendly media put in much effort to evoke a democratic buzz in the country, there was a 
remarkable drop of eight per cent in the voting turn-out compared to 2008. It is argued that 
this is partly due to the ‘silent emergence’ of social, economic and political rifts among the 
Bhutanese. These grievances are reflected in the growing polarisation of the society. It is 
stressed here that the appearance of polarisation is due to the growing disparities based on an 
increasingly distorted access to economic and political resources. This phenomenon finds 
expression in a slowly-emerging rift between the small newly-urbanised and educated middle 
class vis-à-vis the rural people who constitute the bulk of the Bhutanese population. In order 
to understand this, one should keep in mind that politics in Bhutan still remains an exclusive 
and, as already indicated before, elite-driven process. However, Bhutan’s political elite does 
not comprise merely the King and his closest advisors. Rather, elitist politics are 
characterised by an informal but persistent and mutually-influencing interaction between the 
royal family and the newly-emerged middle class. This small but growing middle class 
consists of bureaucrats and an increasingly-vocal group of economic entrepreneurs in the 
country’s few ‘urbanising centres’. Because of their economic interests, Bhutan’s middle 
class was instrumental in the opening up of the country, and are also a driving force behind 
the ongoing democratisation process.  
 
The idea of mutual consultancy in the political decision-making process is nothing new in 
Bhutan. Its origins date back to the old Chhoesi system, which was a dual concept of 
government that prevailed from 1650 to 1907, comprising a temporal head (Druk Desi) and a 
religious leader (Je Khenpo) as the leading institutions of the country’s socio-political 
system. It was established by Ngawang Namgyal, the founder of the modern state of Bhutan, 
and is recognised as a significant landmark in the genesis of Bhutan’s structure of 
governance. Various aspects of the Chhoesi-system still exist and continue to play a 
significant role in the country’s development process. This finds expression not only in the 
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fact that the religious institutions still have a significant say in political decision-making 
processes, but also in the notion that political processes are based on power-sharing, 
mutuality and exchange. The contemporary power-sharing system got enhanced through the 
broadening of the country’s political and economic upper crust, combined with the 
appearance of informal inter-elite arrangements. This phenomenon can be best seen in the 
‘behind the scenes’ incorporation of members belonging to the middle class, especially of 
those who received specialised higher education abroad, in the political decision-making 
process. In sum, the democratic transition is not a process that was ordered by the King only; 
it was also initiated and supported by a middle class which is guided by its own interests in 
enhancing democratic enthusiasm in the country. Without the help of this middle class, 
neither the build-up of functioning institutions nor the introduction of meaningful elections 
would have been possible. 
 
 
A Myth of Popular ‘Apathy’ 
 
One should also place the myth about the ‘apathy’ of the Bhutanese people under scrutiny. It 
is true that in the first phases of the introduction of electoral process, the Bhutanese did not 
demonstrate overwhelming enthusiasm. Certain political commentators attributed this to a 
collective state of apathy of the Bhutanese people towards democracy. However, this could 
be better explained as an expression of prudence when being confronted with something that 
was not only absolutely new but also constituted a fundamental change in the country’s 
political and socio-economic environment. In this context, one must recognise that Bhutan is 
an extraordinarily remote and isolated place, not only regarding its geographic location but 
also in terms of its connections with the international community, apart from India: until 
1907, when the hereditary monarchy was established, Bhutan was completely cut off from 
the outside world. One of the most significant features of this remarkable phenomenon is that 
the Himalayan state, approximately the size of Switzerland, is in a persistent struggle to keep 
a balance between state development and the maintenance of a suitable but also quite peculiar 
socio-political structure. ‘Ground breaking’ developments among the Bhutanese are not 
automatically perceived as a helpful evolution of a much-missed modernity but as a 
revolutionary occasion that may challenge their time-tested and honoured traditions, norms 
and values. Because of the far-reaching consequences, the initial scepticism among the 
people towards elections and democracy did not come as a surprise. Since the first general 
elections in 2008, Bhutan has witnessed one of its most significant political transitions in its 
modern history. Since then, the processes of democratisation – like the building up of 
political parties, development of parliamentary culture and procedures – are moving forward 
at a leisurely pace. The electoral processes in particular are getting more and more entrenched 
not only in the political system but also in the people’s mind-set, at least among the middle 
class. 
 
On a more cynical note, it seems that the transition from an absolute monarchy to a 
constitutional parliamentary monarchy had emerged not only from an act of altruism but also 
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from a line of thought driven by realpolitik. It was likely based on a clear assessment of the 
potential trajectories for the viability of the monarchical system in Bhutan. Several trends and 
phenomena indicated a rather pessimistic future for an absolute monarchy in the country. 
Some factors at work were: Bhutan’s sense of  being surrounded by semi-communist and 
democratic systems; Bhutan’s  experience of  a ‘pseudo coup’ in 1964 which involved an 
uncle of the king and led to the assassination of the prime minister; the emergence of an 
opposition in Bhutan (1990s); the debatable integration of the kingdom of Sikkim with the 
Indian Union, as well as a decline of Bhutan’s image on the international stage because of the 
expulsion of around 100,000 Bhutanese of Nepali origin; and the appearance of militant 
opposition like the Bhutan Tiger Force or the Bhutan Maoist Party. In those circumstances, 
the king had to act in order to maintain at least a minimum of monarchical elements in 
Bhutan’s future political system in order to guarantee the survival of the Wangchuck dynasty. 
 
Finally, with the repetition this year of the successful 2008 parliamentary elections, 
democracy has arrived in the Himalayan kingdom. As in any other country, a process with 
such tremendous impact on state and society does not come without any side-effects. First of 
all, it created a power vacuum which got immediately filled with the newly-emerged and 
largely-foreign-educated middle class. It was perceived by the politically-aware segments of 
the rural population that the rising significance of this class was or would be at the expense of 
the traditional stakeholders like village representatives as well as the uneducated, poor 
population. It is argued here that this will further enhance the socio-economic inequalities due 
to a distortion regarding the access to national resources like governmental posts and national 
revenues. This conflict will gain further prominence, with the country’s development 
continuing in regard to the untapped resources in the context of negotiation over a fair 
mechanism for the distribution of national wealth (especially regarding the revenues that are 
derived from the rapidly-growing hydropower sector). The fact that Bhutan still lacks a 
significant civil society, which could serve as an extra-parliamentary mechanism to aggregate 
interests and demands of the common Bhutanese people, further aggravates the challenge of 
managing social harmony.  
 
 
National Assembly Polls  
 
However, in order not to deepen this polarisation, the rural population has to be further 
included in the political process. Until now, the people in the more remote areas of the 
country showed only limited interest in taking part in the elections either as candidate or as 
voter. Much more has to be done to build up awareness among the ‘rural Bhutanese’ about 
the benefits of political participation and their ability to have a say in matters that relate to 
them. It will be most interesting to observe how far this cleavage will be reflected in the 
party-focused two-round National Assembly elections, now under way.  
 
In sum, the problem is not only about a rural-urban divide, but also about the uneducated-
educated divide. This cross-cutting cleavage appears especially in tertiary education. 
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Regarding primary and secondary education, the country has already made much progress. 
The fact that candidature for elections requires a Bachelor’s degree does not help enhance the 
voter turn-out. Furthermore, women should be encouraged more, not only to vote but also to 
stand up for elections. In the latest NC elections, only five out of the 67 candidates were 
female. The fact that Bhutan has more females (50.8 %) than males (49.2 %) registered voters 
might have some positive effects on the voter turn-out. Since there is no minimum quota for 
women in the parliament, an introduction of a quota might give an additional impetus for 
higher political participation by Bhutan’s female voters.  
 
The transition towards democracy is irreversible, although the affection of the people towards 
the monarchy is deep. It is therefore crucial that more Bhutanese familiarise themselves with 
the new political developments and that they understand that there is no contradiction 
between practising democracy and appreciating their King and traditions. Despite the 
incorporation of more actors in the country’s decision-making process, politics in Bhutan 
remains an exclusive business run by the elite, which now has got some new stakeholders as 
well. The King’s decision to delegate his executive power could also be interpreted as a 
strategy to save as much as possible of the new status quo for his heirs. Most important in this 
context is who will control the armed forces, the king or the elected parliament. Until now, 
formal mechanisms for parliamentary oversight have remained rudimentary.  
 
Additionally, there is a substantial Indian influence in Bhutan’s ‘security sector’; and it is 
unlikely that any fundamental change will be made without ‘advice’ from New Delhi. In 
addition to the question of civilian supremacy, the issue of who owns the country’s most 
lucrative businesses will gain significance. In other words: who has the power of the purse? 
The decision-making processes should be under the auspices of law-makers rather than elitist 
groups who greatly influence the decision-making procedures in consultation with the King. 
Only a strong parliament, legitimised by a high voter turn-out, can protect the country from 
extra-constitutional influence. 
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